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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

1 December 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Graham Fuller, National Intelligence Officer
for the Near East and South Asia

FROM : Charles E. Waterman, Vice Chairman
National Intelligence Council


SUBJECT : Policy Planning Conference - Middle East

1. This is to confirm our invitation to participate in the Middle East Policy Planning Conference scheduled for 8 December, 1-5 p.m. in Room 7219, Department of State.

2. Our agenda (attached) will be to devote approximately one hour to each of the issues listed. We ask the individuals indicated to kick off each discussion by uncoordinated five-minute expositions of their views on the problem.

3. We will record the consensus views and note significant contrary positions in a limited distribution written document. No attribution of positions to specific participants will be given.

4. We have attempted to select a mix of both agencies and intellectual perspectives among the 13 participants. Any from outside of government are fully cleared. The meeting will be co-chaired by Stephen Bosworth and Charles Waterman.



Charles E. Waterman

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1. Is a "solution" or at least a substantial amelioration of the Palestinian problem essential to US interests, or will it gradually become less of a potent irritant if merely left to evolve? Will the Palestinian movement grow into a true insurgency without "settlement," or will a process of accommodation occur? How does Syria's increasing control of the Palestine movement affect this situation? (The prevailing US assumption, including that which underlay Camp David, is that a Palestinian resolution is central to US interests and will become more, not less of an irritant.) Introductions: Five minutes each. [redacted] Tom Wukitch (INR)

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2. Is there a degree of flexibility to be found anywhere in the Israeli body politic which realistically offers the likelihood of a compromise on the West Bank/Gaza/Jerusalem acceptable to even moderate Arabs? Is the basic trend in Israel toward greater or lesser flexibility? Does US credibility remain sufficiently strong with both Arabs and Israelis to affect this trend. (The prevailing US assumption is that such flexibility exists in liberal Israeli circles, under certain circumstances, and that we retain credibility). Introductions: Five minutes each. Geoffrey Kemp (NSC); Dennis Ross (Office of Net Assessment-DoD)

3. With the passage of time and continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, under what kinds of conditions would the current Israeli military advantage be threatened? Is the future orientation of Egypt sufficiently in doubt to be a factor? Would proliferation of nuclear weapons to the area (e.g., Iraq, Libya, or Pakistan) decisively change these calculations? In other words, is time on Israel's side in the Middle East?

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[redacted] Introductions: Five minutes each. Don Fortier (NSC); [redacted]
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4. Would substantial Western disengagement from Lebanon lead to an intolerable situation for Western interests? Has the fact of US and Western involvement during the past year irrevocably endowed Lebanon with a critical importance beyond that of purely regional considerations. Would a Western disengagement be likely to produce a new Arab-Israeli war? Introductions: Five minutes each. Graham Fuller (National Intelligence Officer-Near East and South Asia); Peter Rodman (State Policy Planning)

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Dennis Ross, Deputy Director
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
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
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